Accessing The UK Presidency: A Second Pillar Perspective. EIPA Working Paper: 98/W/04 by Duke, Simon
Assessing the UK
presidency:
A Second Pillar
Perspective
Dr Simon Duke
Working
Paper
98/W/04© EIPA
1
Assessing the UK presidency: A Second Pillar Perspective
Prime Minister Tony Blair’s stated goal for the presidency was that the United
Kingdom should ‘lead in Europe.’ Robin Cook, the Foreign Secretary, said in the autumn of
1997 that the UK ‘now has a government with a secure majority and a strong leader able to
seize the opportunity to shape the direction of Europe.’
1 Any assessment of the overall
effectiveness of any given presidency must rest upon its overall performance in relation to its
intended goals. The goals outlined for the UK presidency, discussed in more detail below,
were extremely ambitious but not unduly so when compared to those of the succeeding
Austrian presidency.
2
What follows is part of a wider project considering the UK presidency of the EU,
from 1 January to 30 June 1998. Separate assessments will be made regarding first and third
pillar activities. The second pillar activities of the presidency are of particular importance or,
in the case of the UK presidency, perhaps of most importance. Certainly, any cursory glance
at the work programme of the presidency indicates a strong concentration on second pillar
activities. This suggests that the second pillar, due to its intergovernmental and relatively
unbureaucratic nature, may be an area in which the presidency feels able to leave its mark.
The first pillar agenda was however daunting since the presidency set out to act as pilot for
European Monetary Union (EMU), to address employment issues, as well as the enlargement
process with Central Europe and Cyprus. Britain’s well known difficulties with the former,
notwithstanding ‘New’ Labour’s efforts, perhaps drew an undue amount of critical comments
to the detriment of the presidency’s achievements in other areas. The third pillar, Justice and
Home Affairs (JHA), also featured an ambitious agenda with collaboration amongst the EU
customs authorities as the platform of a concerted anti-drug drive.
                                                
1 Alan Osborn, ‘UK assumed EU presidency,’ Europe, Dec./Jan. 1997, p.11.
2 Austrian Chancellor, Viktor Klima, saw the Austrian Presidency’s goals to speed up the development of the
European Union, employment, making Europe ‘as fit for employment as for the euro,’ and care of the
environment and security. See Robert J. Guttman, Interview with Austrian Chancellor, Europe, June/July 1998,
p.11.© EIPA
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One of the obvious problems besetting any assessment of the UK presidency, or that
of any other country, is how can one reasonably measure performance? The duration of the
office, a mere six months, means that a good deal of the agenda will be inherited by an
incoming presidency from previous Presidencies. The term in office is sufficiently short to
prohibit most major initiatives from having any chance of coming to fruition. It would though
be incorrect to portray the presidency merely as a ‘caretaker’ or managerial post where the
seat is kept warm. However, given the limited time period, the question of what can
reasonably be expected of a presidency has to be posed. Additional questions should be
raised regarding any kudos or opprobrium that may befall a presidency if a major initiative
launched under a previous presidency succeeds or fails. Lastly, without hopefully being
pedantic, the term in office of the presidency is specific but should the record of the
presidency as part of the Troika be included in the assessment? In other words, should the
presidency be assessed over an eighteen-month period? The difficulty of measuring the
presidency proper, the six month term, has been summarised by Adriaan Schout when he
observed that ‘the outcome depends on 19 Councils and one or two summits.’
3
The expectations befalling any given presidency may well be shaped (where
applicable) by past presidencies. In this regard the British presidency of 1992 may well have
encouraged a somewhat sceptical attitude towards Britain’s ability to lead Europe or its
ability to steer a neutral line. More generally Britain has been portrayed as the awkward
partner in the community.  The agenda of the January-June 1998 UK presidency has to be set
in the context of the Prime Minister’s drive to distance himself from the Conservative legacy
regarding Britain’s role in Europe with the ‘new cooperative approach to Europe.’
4
Accordingly, any assessment of a presidency should be made with an eye on the intended
audiences. In Britain’s case the presidency was very much linked to Labour’s domestic
agenda and to the continued disarray within the Conservative Party where the ‘Europe’
question continues to be highly divisive. The success of the presidency therefore needs to be
measured by the domestic reaction to the presidency as well as at the European or even
international levels.
Let us now turn to the more specific issue of assessing a presidency’s performance
within a pillar – in this case, the second.  The second pillar, addressing the Common Foreign
and Security Policy (CFSP) is the most intergovernmental of the EU’s three pillars. The
                                                
3 Adriaan Schout, ‘The presidency as Juggler: Managing Conflicting Expectations,’ EIPASCOPE, No.1998/2,
p.5.
4 UK Presidency: Half Time Report, <http://presid.fco.uk/achievements/>© EIPA
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history of CFSP and its predecessor, the European Political Cooperation process, is replete
with examples of thwarted attempts to apply the acquis of the Community to external affairs.
The second pillar is also often portrayed as somewhat ineffective but, paradoxically, it may
well be due to its intergovernmental nature and its relatively weak structures that
intergovernmental affairs are somewhat easier to secure agreement on, especially if the
outcome is non-binding declarations or common positions. This might suggest that a
presidency determined to leave its mark may well concentrate on the second pillar for results.
The political preferences in Britain continue to lean towards the maintenance of a distinction
between the ‘intergovernmental’ and ‘Community’ aspects of any European treaty.
5
The public expectations for the presidency may also differ between the pillars. With
regard to the second (and perhaps third) pillar, the world of diplomacy, summits and
multilateral agreements are somewhat distant from the public, especially in the post-cold war
setting when the preoccupation amongst many industrialised democracies is upon their
domestic agendas. The expectations of the public may be presented as a central paradox for
the EU since, as Time magazine commented, ‘citizens expect the Union to be more forceful
in some ways – foreign policy and crime prevention, for instance – but not to meddle in
national politics while being so.’
6
So, how should assessment of the UK presidency’s achievements or shortcomings in
the second pillar be tackled? One approach, adopted by Adriaan Schout, is to start with an
understanding of the tasks of the presidency as a rough yardstick. Schout suggests that the
presidency’s task involves juggling three balls – the political role (leadership), neutrality, and
national interests.
7 Each of the ‘balls’ could be considered as ‘elements of success’ to be used
in an assessment exercise. The three balls, which together comprise a ‘task environment,’ are
open to the challenge of whether such conceptual clarity can be applied to the presidency. For
instance, Britain has historically had an awkward relationship with the Community and one
could therefore question the extent to which Britain could be perceived as neutral (as distinct
from efforts to portray itself as neutral). Basic differences in economic and political weight
also have to be considered. Intuitively one would expect the big four (at least) to advance a
more conspicuous national interest agenda than a smaller state, especially if the latter was a
net beneficiary of the Community’s munificence. As an example, Chancellor Kohl mentioned
                                                
5 For instance, the European Communities (Amendment) Bill, giving effect to the Treaty of Amsterdam, did not
include Article 1 of the Amsterdam Treaty relating to amendments to the Treaty on European Union. See
Hansard (Lords), 28 Jan. 1998, Col. 277.
6 James L. Graff, ‘A Likeable Scapegoat,’ Time, Vol.151 (26), 29 June 1998,
7 Schout, p.4.© EIPA
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burden-sharing en passant at the June 1998 Cardiff summit, marking the conclusion of the
UK presidency. However, it would not be surprising if Germany used its leverage within the
Union when it assumes the presidency in the first half of 1999 to put this on the agenda based
largely on national concerns.
8
While it would not be appropriate at this juncture to open up the question of the realist
versus liberal paradigms, the underpinning assumptions about the balance between neutrality,
national interest and the provision of leadership, are very much connected to national
perceptions and anticipated performance of the presidency. Thus, if an observer were more
inclined to a realist outlook, a rigorous defence of national interest would be deemed a
positive outcome whereas, to the liberal spectator, the lack of neutrality and impartiality
would presumably lead to a differing assessment.
One obvious way of approaching the assessment issue would be to consider the
declared intent of the incoming presidency against the actual results achieved.  Such an
approach cannot be completely free of value judgement, but it does at least have the
advantage of being based on goals that were set by the presidency itself.
Goals and achievements – a self-assessment
In line with the observation that any assessment of the UK presidency should be
measured against declared goals, two speeches have been selected in order to ascertain what
the goals were (the remarks though are limited to those pertaining to the second pillar) and
whether they were met. The speeches were both given by Robin Cook, President of the
Council of Ministers and British Foreign Secretary, at the beginning and end of the UK
presidency respectively. The first speech was given to the European Parliament on 14 January
and the second to the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London on 25 June.
                                                
8 Germany pays some 1.26% of its GDP to the EU’s budget which accounts for around 26.3% of the Union’s
total budget. Germany receives only 13.6% of the Union’s outlays.© EIPA
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GOALS (We will…) OUTCOME (We have…)
(14 January Speech to EP, Strasbourg) (25 June Speech to RIIA, London)
… make the EU a more effective voice in the World,  … stopped being so paranoid about federalism
so we will be working to improve the performance and so scared of clever continentals.
 of our CFSP
… We have two important objectives for the … taken the process forward at an impressive
British presidency. First, [on enlargement] to get the speed, but our influence on the process will not
actual negotiations off to a flying start. Second, to help end with our presidency.
those who have further to travel …
… contribute to the peace and prosperity of all the  (Not mentioned)
people of [Cyprus].
… strengthen relations between EU and Turkey. (Not mentioned)
… restore people’s faith that the EU can speak and act … (quoting Demos survey) 68% in EU favour
for them in the world. a Europe-wide approach to foreign policy.
… launch an EU Code of Conduct on arms exports, to  … agreed the EU Code of Conduct on arms
establish agreed standards for all exports by EU exports… For the first time European nations
members. have agreed detailed tests on human rights before
they agree an arms export.
… implement the new EU Joint Action on landmines. …  helped  negotiate  the  convention  banning
landmines.
… a coherent approach to human rights, and make … re-invigorated [Europe’s] dialogue with China
sure that it has a real impact by working on its  on human rights … some political prisoners have
partnership and dialogue with other countries. been released. [EU] Ambassadors have visited
Tibet.
… aim to reach agreement on the EU mandate for  (Not mentioned)
negotiations on a successor to the Lome Convention.
… help implement the peace agreement in Bosnia. …there has been slow but steady progress --
better, in fact, than we could have hoped for a
year ago… In Kosovo, we have helped ensure
that Europe has taken a strong and united
stance…
… improve the EU’s aid effort in the [Balkans]. … Europe gave immediate and practical support
to the new moderate government in Republika
Srpska
… make a positive contribution to the Middle East (Not mentioned)
Peace Process.
…. find out how we can help [Algeria]. (Not mentioned)© EIPA
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What does the self-assessment tell us?  Three points seem to stand out. First, many of
the areas in which the UK presidency declared that it wished to make an impact were in fact
issues that had already been subject to varying degrees of attention by previous Presidencies.
Second, many of those areas where progress was made concerned topics that happened to
come to fruition under the UK presidency (such as the Convention on Land Mines, or the
Code of Conduct on Arms Exports) although some credit should be attributed to sufficient
progress being made to bring agreements to fruition. Third, those areas that were not
mentioned unsurprisingly concern not only intractable problems (Cyprus in particular) but
ones on which there is a good deal of EU sensitivity or involvement. Such ‘hot potatoes’ are
difficult for any presidency to address and may in fact be more of an indictment of the limited
scope and powers of the existing CFSP institutions.
The self-assessment exercise also contained some significant accomplishments that
did not appear in the list of goals for the UK presidency. Robin Cook, in his June speech,
reflected that, ‘One of the most important achievements during our presidency was the
understanding we reached with the US Administration on extra-territorial sanctions. We
headed off a potentially catastrophic trade row.’ The reference to Congress’ Helms-Burton
legislation illustrates two further considerations for any presidency assessment. First, the
ability of the presidency to react to situations that erupt during the term in office is an
important indicator and assessments should not therefore be based solely on static (declared)
goals and accomplishments. Second, relations with third parties may decisively influence the
effectiveness of the presidency – in this case the close working relationship between London
and Washington was an important asset for the EU in its negotiating position. Indeed, in these
cases it might be reasonable to expect a substantial outcome given the ability of the
presidency to exploit its special links (‘leadership’) for the benefit of the Union.
The dangers of over-assessment (or perhaps over aggrandisement) were also
illustrated during the presidency with the publication of a ‘half time report’ in which forty-
five achievements were listed for the first three months of the presidency. The self-promoting
report was framed in the context of the Prime Minister’s pledge in his Waterloo station
speech to show ‘real leadership in Europe.’ In what the Prime Minister described as the
‘People’s Agenda’ he claimed in the report that, ‘Our new relationship with Europe is good
for Britain and, I believe, good for Europe.’
9 The actual list of achievements emphasises the
                                                
9 UK Presidency: Half Time Report, <http:// presid.fco.uk/achievements/>© EIPA
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benefits to the British citizen and less so those to Europeans. The lack of a working definition
of ‘achievements’ meant that even hosting a (scheduled) meeting merited accolades. Of the
seven achievements directly in the second pillar area, scepticism is also warranted.
Half-time report: Europe and the Rest of the World
ACHIEVEMENT COMMENT
BOSNIA: EU assistance with 2 new packages An achievement but much was scheduled
backing up the peace process. 4 million pounds prior to Britain’s assuming the
for new Republika Srpska and framework presidency.
regulations simplifying aid to Bosnia
KOSOVO: leading role in co-ordinating the Hardly a swift reaction and unclear what
response to events. Swift agreement on aid by the purpose of the aid will be in light of
Robin Cook and Tony Lloyd. the growing humanitarian problems
IRAQ: Co-ordinated EU reponse to the weapons The reaction to the weapons crisis was
crisis, rapid agreement to an effective  anything but co-ordinated. Britain, alone,
implementation of the action plan on immigration  supported the U.S. threats of military
from Iraq action.
ALGERIA: quick reponse to further terrorist  True, but the killings go on.
killings including sending of ministerial troika
 in January.
M/E PEACE PROCESS: injected new impetus Also true, but the question of whether
into the peace process, including visits on behalf  Cook’s impromptu actions and remarks
Robin Cook and Derek Fatchett. were sanctioned by the EU remains.
CHINA: united EU approach to China agreed Whatever effect the EU may have had
Upon (23 Feb.) providing a basis for real progress  was soon eclipsed by the U.S. visit.
on human rights.
ASIA: Fatchett visited Asia as EU special  The meeting was scheduled and
emissary on the financial crisis. UK presidency happened to fall under the UK
Prepares for ASEM II in London on 2-3 April. Presidency.
The full list of achievements may be consulted at http://presid.fco.gov.uk/achievements/45things.shtml© EIPA
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The self-assessment exercise is a useful exercise since it moves us nearer to an
understanding of what the UK presidency was trying to do and what it thought it
accomplished. There is though also an apparent need for additional assessments based on
internal and external input.
Internal Assessment of the UK presidency in the Second Pillar
Any internal assessment of the UK presidency is inevitably coloured by party politics,
perhaps moreso in Britain than in many other EU member states. As a result it may not
provide an accurate assessment of the presidency although it certainly adds flavour to the
more general assessment considerations.
Mike Gapes (Labour) reflected upon the somewhat artificial nature of the
expectations piled upon the Labour presidency, either by the party itself or by the opposition,
when he stated:
It is ridiculous to think that any six-month presidency of an organisation such as the
European Union, comprising 15 states, can make a massive difference to the process.
With a bad presidency, things can go badly wrong; with a good presidency, things can
be dealt with efficiently. What needs to be done can be done, and the agenda can be
taken forward – which is what the British presidency has done, in a number of
important ways.
10
A Conservative opposition MP denounced the presidency as a ‘flop of a presidency.’
Those areas in which the presidency had achieved ‘little or nothing’ were identified as jobs,
enlargement, human rights and CAP reform.
11 It was seen as the ‘style-without-substance
presidency.’ The French Finance Minister was quoted as saying that, as a result of the
presidency, Britain has been relegated to the ‘second division.’ The agenda announced at
Waterloo station, launching the presidency, was seen as ‘overblown.’ Martin Walker, writing
in The Guardian, was quoted with approval when he wrote, ‘Fair Europeans … conclude that
the main problem was the inflation of expectations.’
12 Marc Champion, of The European,
was also quoted with his assessment of the UK presidency as ‘bruised by a mix of hubris and
political naivety.’ In reference to the Brussels summit, where the infamous agreement on the
compromise arrangement for the appointment of the first president of the European central
bank was brokered by the presidency, the Austrian Chancellor was quoted as saying, ‘We
                                                
10 Mr. Bill Gapes, Hansard (House of Commons), Col. 1256, 11 June 1998.
11 Mr. Michael Trend, Hansard (House of Commons), Col. 1275, 11 June 1998.© EIPA
9
have now learnt … how not to organise a summit.’
13 The critical remarks of the President of
the European Parliament, the Prime Ministers of Luxembourg and Italy, were also noted.
William Hague, Leader of the Opposition, summarised the UK presidency as one of
‘disappointment, missed opportunities and poor diplomacy.’
14 Hague claimed that it was
‘absolutely clear from the European Council’s conclusions’ that, ‘little or no progress has
been made on the central objectives that the Prime Minister himself set for the UK presidency
of the EU.’
15  The Brussels summit was described as an ‘utter shambles’ and the presidency
generally as ‘an object of derision across the continent.’ The Financial Times was quoted
with approval saying that, ‘The most dispiriting aspect of the summit … was its failure to
inject momentum into the reforms – financial, agricultural, and institutional – essential to
proceed with the enlargement to the east.’
16 The reforms of the structural funds and of the
internal institutions of the EU, which were both regarded as essential prerequisites to
enlargement, were left to the Austrian presidency. On unemployment, Hague commented that
‘the presidency has achieved nothing of substance.’ While on the environment, which had
been described by the Prime Minister as a theme of his presidency, Hague quoted the Friends
of the Earth who assessed the Cardiff summit as ‘not much greener than a multi-storey car
park.’
17 The legacy of the Cardiff summit, according to Hague, was to teach the incoming
Austrian presidency how not to organise a summit.
The Prime Minister responded with a number of quotes from various non-British
press sources, such as a German one, who complimented the Labour Prime Minister by
observing that ‘Britain has presided over two truly historic steps forward towards European
unity during the British EU presidency: the founding of monetary union and the launch of
enlargement.’
18 The Spanish press saw the presidency as ‘competent and professional,’ while
Sweden praised the change in the UK presidency and the ‘will and ambition to actually
achieve something positive and not to only delay and criticise.’
19 Contrary to the Leader of
the Opposition the Prime Minister argued that, ‘we achieved all that we said we would as a
UK presidency. We did launch monetary union, and we did get enlargement off to a flying
start … as for the common agricultural policy, as a result of the conclusions of the
                                                                                                                                                       
12 Ibid., Col. 1276.
13 Ibid., Col. 1277.
14 Mr. William Hague, Hansard (House of Commons), Col. 370, 17 June 1998.
15 Ibid. Loc cit.
16 Ibid., Col. 371.
17 Ibid. Loc cit.
18 The Prime Minister, Hansard (House of Commons), Col. 373, 17 June 1998.
19 Ibid. Loc cit.© EIPA
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Agriculture Council – chaired by Britain – there is already agreement to reduce prices to
consumers by more than £1 billion a year, rising to £2.5 billion later.’
20 On the environment
the Prime Minister reminded the House that ‘we have implemented the Kyoto package’ and
‘we have got Europe to agree on how to implement it.’ While EU-US summit got us a way
around the extraterritorial sanctions of the US – ‘something that other people in the EU have
been trying to do for years.’ On the Brussels summit the Prime Minister admitted that the
‘negotiation was very difficult, but the result was right.’
21
The party political assessment, unsurprisingly, reflected the prevailing political
divisions of the day and the different political philosophy vis-à-vis the EU held by the Labour
and Conservative parties. The use by the Leader of the Opposition and the Prime Minister of
press extracts in support of their assessments of the presidency also shows that there was little
agreement on the effectiveness or otherwise of the presidency.  The record of the debates
does however show how ambitious the presidency was in its objectives and how adverse
criticism was almost inevitable given the lofty goals established by the presidency.
The blanket Conservative criticism also gives rise to the issue of what is actually
feasible in a six-month presidency. A realistic assessment is buried somewhere in the midst
of the hyperbole but it should be borne in mind that the UK presidency had an important
domestic agenda, namely redefining Britain’s relations with Europe. Blair’s conspicuous
move away from the Europe of “Mrs No” towards one where Britain became a major actor
involved laying out an agenda for a Labour led transformation of British relations with
Europe. Vehement Conservative criticism was only to be expected. More generally, the
assessment of the effectiveness of any presidency must be considered from the domestic
vantagepoint as well and not merely at the European level. Indeed, in Britain’s case the
domestic perceptions of the presidency were every bit as important as the external feedback.
External Assessment of the UK presidency in the Second Pillar
The following goals are contained in a ‘Work Programme’ drawn up by the
presidency and, again, it should be borne in mind that the concern here is with those goals
                                                
20 Ibid. Loc cit.
21 Ibid., Col. 374.© EIPA
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pertaining to the second pillar.
22 The reader should be aware that the division of tasks into
pillars is not only somewhat artificial, but poses the inevitable problem of how to address
horizontal issues (such as EU enlargement) that cut across the pillars. The format will be to
list the goals, using the original text and then to formulate assessment questions from the
original text. The questions will, at a later stage, be examined more thoroughly.
i) General:
The UK will build on the commitment in the Amsterdam Treaty to a more
coherent and effective common foreign policy.
(Did the presidency lead to a more coherent and effective common foreign
policy?)
The UK presidency will work on establishing the Planning and Early warning
Unit (PEWU) and discussion of how to implement the other measures agreed
at Amsterdam to improve the operation of CFSP.
(Was the PEWU established?)
ii)  Asia and Europe
The UK will hose the second ASEM in London in April. This will be a means
to forge stronger economic, political and cultural ties between two economic
power-houses…
(Were stronger ties forged? If so, what evidence is there?)
There will be a EU/Japan Summit in Tokyo in January; and the UK presidency
will also look to continue and develop constructive dialogue with China on a
full range of issues, including political and security interests; human rights;
international trade and investment; and global challenges such as the
environment.
(Was the ‘constructive dialogue’ with China developed? If so, how?)
iii)  Transatlantic relations
The UK presidency will host a summit with the US in May which will be an
opportunity to underline the importance of the transatlantic relationship in all
                                                
22 UK presidency of the Council of Ministers of the European Union: Work Programme, Jan. 1998
<http://presid.fco.gov.uk/workprog/>© EIPA
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areas. There will also be a summit with Canada, building on a joint action plan
agreed in 1996.
(In what ways were relations with North America reinforced?)
iv)  ACP/EU
The UK presidency aims to agree the EU mandate for the negotiations with
the 71 ACP countries on a successor to the Lome Convention. The main
progress will be on measurable progress towards the elimination of poverty …
The priority work on aid and development will be moving towards a clearer
commitment to international development targets, with the goal of eliminating
world poverty.
(What progress was made to the commitment to international development
targets? What measurable progress has been made towards the elimination of
poverty?)
v)  Arms Exports: Common Standards
The UK presidency proposes to work on an EU code of conduct setting high
common standards to govern arms exports from all Member States.
(What code was established and did it establish common standards?)
vi)  Human Rights
The UK presidency will adopt a practical approach designed to make existing
policy more effective … this will include helping countries implement
universal standards through co-operation and support, work on new
Development Regulations on Democracy and Human Rights and the new trade
incentives under the GSP.
(Did the UK presidency make existing policy more effective?)
vii)  The Mediterranean and South East Europe
The UK presidency will make every effort to find a way to make (Cyprus’
accession) involve both communities … in a manner acceptable to both.
(Did it?)
[The UK presidency] want to see real progress in negotiations (on Capital
Markets and Energy) with Egypt, Algeria, Lebanon and Syria to accompany© EIPA
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the agreements already reached with Morocco, Tunisia, Israel, Jordan, and the
Palestinian Authority.
(What progress on negotiations was made?)
viii)  Former Yugoslavia and Albania
The UK presidency will continue to work to develop relations with the
countries of the region (Bosnia, Croatia, FRY, FYROM, and Albania) in the
framework of the EU’s regional approach… The presidency will aim to ensure
that the EU plays an effective and useful role in achieving full implementation
of the peace agreements in Bosnia; to this end it aims to include agreements on
improvements to the EC assistance effort.
(Did the presidency secure improvements to the EC assistance effort?)
The presidency will also aim to use EU influence to secure greater progress
towards democracy in the FRY and a solution to the issue of Kosovo.
(Did the presidency security greater progress towards democracy in the FRY
and make progress in a solution to the issue of Kosovo?)
ix)  Eastern Europe
The EU/Russia Summit in March will provide an opportunity for a wide
discussion on key international issues, and to build on the Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement (PCA). We also hope to bring into force the
EU/Ukraine PCA, and to pursue initiatives under the EU/Ukraine Action Plan.
(In what ways was the PCA reinforced and what new initiatives arose in the
context of the EU/Ukraine Action Plan?)
x)  Middle East and MEPP
The UK presidency will … seek to maintain the pressure on the parties to the
Middle East Peace Process (MEPP) to make progress, working closely
alongside the EU Special Envoy Moratinos. We will use our influence within
the Middle East, in Israel and in Washington to try to make sure that the
current talks under US auspices make real progress.
(Was progress made?)© EIPA
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xi)  Africa
The UK presidency will promote coherent action on democracy and good
government in Africa, particularly in the Great Lakes Region (working closely
with the EU’s Special Envoy, Ajello), Nigeria and Sierra Leone.
(Did the presidency promote coherent action on democracy and good
government in Africa?)
xii)  Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
The UK presidency will work to strengthen the non-proliferation regimes, in
particular by promoting early agreement on a verification and compliance
Protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention, and of agreements to
implement strengthened nuclear safeguards.
(Did the UK strengthen non-proliferation regimes and promote early
agreement on a protocol to the BWC?)
xiii)  UN Reform
Under the UK presidency, the EU will continue to lead in supporting UN
institutional reform … we will also work for a solution to the UN’s financial
crisis, based on full payment of dues and reform of the scales of assessment
based on capacity to pay.
(Did the UK presidency demonstrably contribute to UN reforms or the
alleviation of the UN’s budgetary crisis?)
The Work Programmes, like those of any other presidency, are largely ‘inherited’ or
on-going projects.  Indeed, the use of the phrases, ‘continue to lead’, ‘strengthen,’ ‘continuing
priority,’ and ‘making existing policy more effective,’ suggest that the limited six-month
presidency allows for little innovation. The external relations aspects of the previous
presidency, that of Luxembourg, were largely the same as those of the UK presidency.
23 The
similarities in emphasis accorded to a given issue are also striking which suggests two
conclusions. First, the incoming presidency’s programme is largely determined by a number
of long-term issue areas that call for attention (Former Yugoslavia, Albania, Cyprus, reform© EIPA
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of the UN, human rights or disarmament) or those that impose regular obligations upon the
EU (such as regular summits with Russia, the U.S., or ASEM). Second, similarities in the
external relations aspects of successive Presidencies might also suggest that a rudimentary
group of ‘European’ interests have been established and these are then passed from
presidency to presidency. The Work Programme is however only the visible part of the
agenda and much time is spent reacting to events as they occur. A declaration or statement
can be found for virtually every day of the presidency (see Appendix) on such diverse topics
as East Timor, detainees in Belarus, Kosovo, municipal elections in Mozambique, Indian
nuclear tests, the situation in Nigeria, Cambodian elections, settler activities in Jerusalem, and
so forth.
Within the second pillar the failure to appoint a ‘High Representative,’
24 due largely
to French disagreement on the powers and role of the post, also saw a lack of progress in the
design and composition of the PPEWU which falls under the High Representative. The need
to make an appointment was nevertheless agreed upon during the UK presidency and the
appointment will be made at the Vienna summit in December 1998. The appointment raises
the interesting question of whether the expectations of the presidency in the second pillar area
might change as a consequence. Alternatively, the High Representative’s role, which it to
assist the presidency, may complicate the presidency’s task especially if the appointment is
made from one of the larger countries.
25 Although this is not of direct relevance to the UK
presidency it will be from the beginning of next year.
In so far as CFSP is concerned it would appear that the assessment of the UK
presidency (or maybe that of any other) has to be made on the basis of at least three factors:
•   the self-assessment method
•   the presidency’s ability to achieve declared goals (the Work Programme)
•   the ability to react to situations that arise.
26
                                                                                                                                                       
23 For the Programme of the presidency of the Council of the European Union, see
<http://www.uepres.etat.lu/uepres/presid/prog-eng.txt>
24 See Article 18.3, Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union.
25 Felipe Gonzalez was, until recently, a front runner but his alleged involvement in the ‘dirty hand’ reprisals
against suspect ETA terrorists has raised questions regarding his suitability.
26 This, in turn, raises the issue of whether a declaration or statement constitutes an effective or sufficient
‘reaction.’ Would the presidency’s failure to make a declaration or statement on a given issue, that may be quite
beyond the CFSP’s ability to influence, be deemed a shortcoming?© EIPA
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To complicate matters further, the assessment exercise, as applied to the three pillars, is
intended not only to ask how effective the presidency was but also to answer two further
questions:
•   To what extent are lessons arising from the successes/failures of a presidency
relevant for other Presidencies?
•   How and why were given courses of action adopted?
It is the last question that demands the most intrusive research since the concentration
will be upon the internal workings of the presidency at the level of the national bureaucracies.
This is perhaps the most problematic aspect of the research question since the interministerial
processes may not be transparent and indeed may be resistant to intrusive questioning.
Finally, the concentration upon the presidency, and upon a pillar within it, may lead to the
familiar problem of losing sight of the wood for the trees. The presidency is but part of a
broader agenda and the priority accorded to it will depend very much upon other internal and
external factors. For instance, the considerable attention given to the Peace Talks in Northern
Ireland by the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary may well have distracted them from
complete engagement (and perhaps consultation!) in CFSP matters.© EIPA
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Summary
This preliminary discourse has attempted to develop a number of approaches to
assessing the presidency. It seems clear that any such exercise should involve several layers
of assessment but, so far, I have reservations about how ‘scientific’ any findings might be.
The observations in this brief overview owe more to impressionism!
The number of potential case studies presented above poses the issue of
manageability. The sheer volume of material is impressive, if also daunting. On the question
of methodology, let me raise a number of points (which have also arisen in informal
discussions with MDB):
i)  Upon what basis should cases be selected (how many)?
ii)  What common analytical tools can we agree upon so that the results from the
individual pillar case studies are coherent?
iii)  How should we address horizontal issues, such as EU enlargement, which do
not belong in any one pillar in particular?
iv)  How do we make our approach scientific and avoid value judgements?
v)  To what extent can we attribute the outcome of a given policy/initiative to any
given presidency, given the limited potential to launch and complete a major
project within the six-month period in office?
vi)  When is a presidency not a presidency (should we include the Troika as part of
the assessment exercise)?
vii)  Given the amount of material that may have to be sifted through, what
timetable is realistic for completion of the various stages of the exercise?© EIPA
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Appendix
Declarations and Statements
(reverse chronological order)
30 June Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: EAST TIMOR
29 June Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: ANGOLA
26 June Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: BURUNDI: PEACE
TALKS
25 June Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: CAMBODIAN
ELECTIONS
24 June Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union:
TONY LLOYD TO VISIT NIGERIA
24 June Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union:
EU TROIKA AMBASSADORS VISIT TO EAST TIMOR
24 June Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: CROATIA: REFUGEE
RETURNS
22 June Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: JERUSALEM: ISRAELI
GOVERNMENT PROPOSALS
16 June Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: GUINEA-BISSAU
16 June Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: NIGERIA
12 June Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: NIGERIA
12 June Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: SETTLERS'
ACTIVITIES IN EAST JERUSALEM
11 June Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: BURUNDI: PEACE
PROCESS
9 June Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: NIGERIA: DEATH OF
GENERAL ABACHA
8 June Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: TAJIKISTAN
4 June Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: ETHIOPIA/ERITREA
BORDER DISPUTE
4 June Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: BLACK SEA
ECONOMIC COOPERATION COUNCIL SUMMIT, 4-5 June
2 June Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: ABKHAZIA
29 May Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: DANISH
REFERENDUM RESULT
29 May Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: MOZAMBIQUE:
MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS
29 May Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union:
NIGER
27 May Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: NIGERIA: HUMAN
RIGHTS
21 May Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: SOEHARTO
RESIGNATION
21 May Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: ROMANIA:
AMENDMENTS TO CRIMINAL CODE
15 May Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: ETHIOPIA/ERITREA
BORDER CLASHES
13 May Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: KOSOVO: MEETING
OF PRESIDENT MILOSEVIC AND DR RUGOVA
13 May Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: INDONESIA
13 May Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: TURKEY: SHOOTING© EIPA
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OF HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST
11 May Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: INDIAN NUCLEAR
TEST
5 May Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: SITUATION IN
NIGERIA
1 May Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: SITUATION IN SUDAN
29 Apr Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: LATEST MASSACRE IN
ALGERIA
24 Apr Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: KOSOVO
24 Apr Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: NIGERIA: NATIONAL
ASSEMBLY AND SENATE ELECTIONS
24 Apr Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: TIBET: HUNGER
STRIKE
24 Apr Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: RWANDAN
EXECUTIONS
20 Apr Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: NIGERIA: ADOPTION
OF ABACHA AS PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE
17 Apr Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF CONGO: WITHDRAWAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS ENQUIRY TEAM
16 Apr Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: AFGHANISTAN:
THREAT OF FURTHER FIGHTING
27 Mar Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: ESTONIA: ABOLITION
OF THE DEATH PENALTY
23 Mar Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: KOSOVO: EDUCATION
AGREEMENT
23 Mar Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: CROATIA: EU
STATEMENT
Full text of paper passed to Dr Granic, Croatian Foreign Minister
20 Mar Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: KOSOVO
20 Mar Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: NIGERIA: VISIT BY
THE POPE, 21-23 MARCH
18 Mar Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: ZAMBIA: LIFTING OF
STATE OF EMERGENCY
18 Mar Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: FEDERAL REPUBLIC
OF YUGOSLAVIA: HARASSMENT OF THE MEDIA
13 Mar Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: ATTACK ON REFUGEE
CAMP IN THAILAND
4 Mar Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: IRAQ: SCR 1154
3 Mar Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: KOSOVO
2 Mar Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: BELARUS: EU CALLS
FOR CLEMENCY FOR DETAINEES
2 Mar Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: BURMA: REPORTED
ARREST OF STUDENT ACTIVISTS
27 Feb Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: SPEECH BY
CROATIAN PRESIDENT
24 Feb Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: ALBANIA
20 Feb Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: SIERRA LEONE
20 Feb Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: IRAQ
19 Feb Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION ON IRAQ: STATEMENT BY DEREK FATCHETT
19 Feb Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: ABOLITION OF THE
DEATH PENALTY IN AZERBAIJAN
15 Feb Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: CYPRUS ELECTIONS
14 Feb Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: SALMAN RUSHDIE:
9TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FATWA© EIPA
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13 Feb Communiqué: Ministerial Meeting EU-Mexico (English/Espanol)
Communiqué: Ministerial Meetings between EU, Mercosur, Chile and Bolivia
(English/Espanol)
Communiqué: EU-Andean Community (English/Espanol)
Communiqué: EU-Rio Group (English/Espanol)
4 Feb Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: EXPANSION OF
ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK: STATEMENT BY MR FATCHETT
30 Jan Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: ZAMBIA: EXTENSION
OF STATE OF EMERGENCY
27 Jan Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: BOSNIA: REPUBLIKA
SRPSKA: EU presidency OFFERS AID TO NEW GOVERNMENT
26 Jan Press release issued by the presidency: ROBIN COOK OPENS THE EU'S DOORS TO
THE PUBLIC
20 Jan Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: TURKEY: BANNING
OF REFAH PARTY
20 Jan Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: EU/TROIKA MISSION
TO ALGERIA
19 Jan Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: NEW GOVERNMENT
OF REPUBLIKA SRPSKA
15 Jan Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: MONTENEGRO:
STATEMENT BY MR LLOYD
15 Jan Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: EU TROIKA VISIT TO
ALGERIA
13 Jan Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: EU TROIKA VISIT TO
ALGERIA
9 Jan Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: EXPANSION OF
ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN THE WEST BANK
8 Jan Statement by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: EU TROIKA VISIT TO
ALGERIA
6 Jan Statement by the European Union: OUTCOME OF KENYAN ELECTIONS
5 Jan Declaration by the presidency on behalf of the European Union: MASSACRES IN
ALGERIA
Source: <http://presid.fco.gov.uk/news/decs.shtml>